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HUNDRED AND TWENTY-TWO

"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a
telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very
tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
CONTRACTS-OFFER OF REWARD FOR INFORMATION
LEADING TO CONVICTION OF AN OFFENDER-RIGHT TO
REWARD ON DEATH OF CONVICTED PARTY AFTER ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND APPEAL THEREFROM
BUT BEFORE A HEARING ON THE APPEAL. Scott v. American
Express Company! Defendant offered a reward for first information
leading to the arrest and conviction of the person who robbed a certain
express messenger. Plaintiff gave information which led to the arrest
and conviction of one Buntyn in Tennessee. Buntyn, on conviction, appealed and while his appeal was pending but before it was heard died.
Under this state of facts, plaintiff claimed that he had earned the reward
and brought an action in Missouri to recover the same. Plaintiff had
judgment in the lower court, but the Springfield Court of Appeals reversed it, holding that plaintiff could not recover because "conviction"
meant final conviction, and also because defendant's purpose in making the
offer was to secure Buntyn's punishment. It was stated that in as
much as there had been neither a final conviction, nor an attainment of
defendant's end, plaintiff was not entitled to the reward.
1.

(1921)

233 S. W. 492.

2.

(21.)

(1921)

233 S. W. 1. e. 493.
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The decisions of all courts seem to agree that an advertisement, offering a reward for the conviction of a criminal offender, is an offer,
which looks to the formation of an unilateral contract, i. e. the advertiser contemplates as the acceptance of his offer, an act or a series of
acts. If the expected act or acts are performed by any one with the
intention of accepting the offer, a contract results, and the offerer will
be bound to pay the reward.' But every offer, to ripen into a contract,
must be accepted according to its terms, and therefore the difficult question in this type of case is to ascertain what is meant by "conviction".
If what is done by the claimant of the reward has not led to a conviction in the intended sense of that word, there is no contract because the
acts contemplated by the offerer have not been accomplished and there
has been no acceptance of the offer within its meaning. Obviously the
decision in the instant case is correct if "conviction" as stipulated for
in the offer meant legal conviction, as there was no such occurrence until
final judgment was entered, and the death of the convicted party pending the appeal abated "the prosecution and cause of action" entirely.'
Is it proper then to hold with the court that "conviction" has this technical meaning in offers of this kind?
An accurate answer to the above question will depend on ascertaining what the ordinary offerer of a reward for a conviction reasonably
expects to get by way of performance from the party who attempts to
accept his offer. An offerer is not entitled to attribute an unusual meaning to his offer, or to say that it carried a meaning different from what
it appeared 1o mean to a reasonably intelligent man. If an offerer has
done that which the offer, reasonably interpreted, appeared to call for
as an acceptance, the offerer will be bound, and there will be a contract
even though the offerer desired the offer to demand something other
than that which was performed, and did not wish to be bound contractually under the actually existing conditions. In determining whether or not
there has been an acceptance of an offer, the question invariably is, what was
the offerer's objective intent? The courts are not concerned with the latter's
subjective intentions and expectations. What did the offerer, as reasonably understood, appear to ask for as an acceptance is the test, and if
the offeree has accepted according to such a construction of the offer
there is a contract.5
3. Lovejoy v. Atchison, etc., R. R.
(1893)
53 Mo. App. 386; Freeman v.
City of Boston (1842)
46 Mass. 56;
Furman v. Pike (1848) 21 N. J. L. 310.
See also Harrard v. Dickerson (1914)
180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135 (offer
of reward for capture); Cummings v.
Clinton Co. (1903) 181 Mo. 162, 79 S.

W. 1127 (offer of a reward for arrest);

Smith v. Vernon Co. (1905)
188 Mo.
501, 87 S. W. 942 (offer of reward for
arrest).
4.
(1921)
233 S. W. 1. C. 493. See
accord State v. Perrine (1874) 56 Mo.
602; Carrolton v. Rhomberg (1883) 78
Mo. 547. See U. S. v. Pomeroy (1907)
152 Fed. 279.

5.

Williston, Contracts, sec.

21.
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In the ordinary case, when an offer is made for information leading
to the conviction of a person, the normal purpose attributable to the
offerer will be that of having the proper court take jurisdiction of the
offender and finally enforcing the judgment after guilt has been established in the manner provided by law. If the offeree supplies the evidence requisite to secure such court action, and the proper officials procure the action, the offer has been accepted and the reward has been
earned.' The offer cannot contemplate personal action by the offeree
beyond this point and his own personal testimony if called for. Manifestly, it could not require any action on the part of the offeree other
than this, as this is the only possible participation in the conviction that
the latter could have. But in the usual case there must be this kind of
court action, and until it is finally taken, there can be no contract with
respect to the reward. So, it has been held that if -the offender commits suicide before the trial there has been no acceptance of the offer,
even though the information tendered by the offeree would have been
sufficient for a conviction, if the offender had only lived and been placed
on trial.! Such a decision is correct. It should make no difference that
the cause of failure to convict was due to some matter beyond the control of the offeree. The offer was conditional and the offerer agreed
to be bound only if the condition was complied with. Again, and for the
same reason, it has been ruled that a plaintiff cannot recover the reward
where there has been a conviction in the lower court, followed by an
appeal still pending.' The rule, then, usually is that the reward has not
been earned until the offender has been brought to justice and his case
duly and finally disposed of on the basis of his established guilt.
It was said in the decision under review that the purpose of the offerer in making an offer of this kind is to procure the punishment of
the criminal, and, therefore, unless punishment follows that the reward
could not be claimed.' But this statement, taken alone, is too broad, and
there are cases where the reward will be recoverable, even though the
offender may not have been punished. Suppose that conviction follows
6. Re Kelly (1872)
39 Conn. 159;
Elkins v. Commissioners (1898) 86 Kan.
305, 120 Pac. 542; Crawshao v. Roxbury
(1856) 7 Gray (Mass.) 374; Porterfield
v. State (1893) 92 Tenn. 289, 21 S. W.
519; Tobin v. McComb (1913) 156 S. W.
(Tex.) 237.
Some courts are disposed
to be still more liberal.
Thus in Rogers v. McRoach (N. Y. Sup. Court.)
(1909) 120 N. Y. Supp. 686. it was held
that the plaintiff was entitled to a reward.
He had furnished only a clue to
the police who, acting thereon, arrested

the criminal and caused his conviction.
But see Lovejoy v. Atchison etc. R. R.,
supra, note 3.
7. Fortier v. Wilson (1883) 11 U. C.
C. P. 495.
8. Stone v. Wickliffe (1899) 106 Ky.
252, 50 S. W. 44.
See Cornwell v. St.
Louis etc. Co. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 258,
73 S. W. 305.
9. (1921) 233 S. W. 1. c. 493. This
is the general rule.
See also Fortier v.
Wilson, supra, note 7; Re Kelly, supra,
note 6.
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the offeree's action, but that sentence is suspended, or even commuted, or
that the convicted party is pardoned. It would not be accurate in a case
of this kind -o hold that the offer had not been accepted. As a matter
of fact it has been, because the offender had been "brought to justice"
and the case had been finally disposed of on the basis of the latter's
guilt. Indeed it would be correct to say that in every case where there
has been a technical conviction, which has been followed by any possible legal result, which has not upset or invalidated the conviction, the
reward should be regarded as due. In every such case there has been
compliance with the terms of the offer, and if punishment of the offender
has not ensued, this was not because there had not been a conviction,
but because the law did not provide for punishment."
In certain cases, at first blush,-it may appear as if the plaintiff ought
to be entitled to the reward even though there has not been a conviction.
Such a holding may appeal to us as being proper in a case where a
plaintiff has acquired all apparently essential evidence for a conviction,
but, due to no fault of his own, no trial is had. Suppose that the offender dies before the trial or suppose that the state officials refuse to
prosecute; in such cases our compassion is with the plaintiff and it might
lead us to hold that he should recover the reward. This would seem
especially to be the case where the alleged criminal dies before his trial.
The principal case is analogous to those supposed. It is doubted, however, if there is any legal basis for deciding that the reward has been
earned and it is believed that the holding in the case under review is
sound. It is not perceived how a plaintiff can assert with any degree of
success that the offer meant evidence which probably would have secured
a conviction or have brought the offender to justice had final court action
occurred. The offerer was interested not in possibilities but in the
actual meting out of justice according to law to the man who committed the crime, which called forth the reward. If there was no conviction the purpose of the offerer was not accomplished; and if the offender
died and conviction was no longer possible then there was no longer
any purpose in the mind of the offerer to be subserved. This is the only
reasonable interpretation which can be placed on such an offer, and for
this reason there is no justification for a plaintiff claiming the reward
under these conditions.
10. Williams v. U. S. (1868) 12 U.
S. Court of Claims 192 (suspended sentence); Wilinore v. Hensel (1892) 25
Atl. (Pa.) 86. See also Louisville etc.
R. R. v. Goodnight, infra, note 11. A
peculiar ease is Buckley v. Schwartz
(1892) 83 Wis. 305, 53 N. W. 511. It

was there held that plaintiff had accepted an offer to pay a reward for securing a conviction before a jury by obtaining a verdict of guilty even though an
order in arrest of judgment was entered.
The court held that the order did not
set aside the verdict in a criminal case.
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Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Goodnight"' deserves separate
consideration because of the peculiar situation there presented. Plaintiff
in error offered a reward for the capture and conviction of each of the
persons who aided in derailing one of its trains. Defendants in error
procured the arrest of two of the offenders, Cornwell and Evans, and
upon their evidence they were duly indicted. They confessed their guilt
in open court. The company's attorneys were also employed in the prosecution of the offenders and they, together with the prosecuting officials
of the Commonwealth, deemed it advisable to procure the dismissal of
the indictments against Cornwell and Evans in order that they might
more feasibly turn state's evidence and aid in the apprehension and conviction of others who had been associated with them in the commission
of the crime and who were regarded by the prosecution as being more
flagrant violators of the law. In pursuance of this scheme, the indictment
was dismissed and Evans and Cornwell were set free. The defendants
in error, nevertheless, claimed the reward. It was conceded that the
freed persons were guilty, and in all probability could have been convicted upon their confessions and other evidence that defendants in error
had procured. Plaintiff in error denied its obligation on the ground that
there had been no conviction within the meaning of the offer. The court
decided, however, for defendants in error on the extremely narrow
ground that the company through its own attorneys in causing the dismissal of the indictments against Cornwell and Evans had itself prevented the performance of the contract by defendants in error and could
not fo'r this reason escape its liability. In this connection, the court said:
"* * * if the happening of the event upon which their right to the reward depended was hindered or prevented by the act of the company,
such hindrance was in law equivalent to the completion of the condition
precedent, and the railroad company is liable on its contract to pay the
reward, although it may have acted in the matter in the utmost good
faith."'"
Perhaps such prevention ought to have been regarded as the
equivalent of performance by defendants in error, or a waiver of such
performance if caused by the company. It is conceivable, however, that
the act of assisting in obtaining a conviction was not only a condition to
claiming the reward but also a part of the acceptance of the offer. If this
were the case there is reputable authority to the effect that the company's
act of hindrance, if known to the offerees, would amount to a revocation of the offer and would thus prevent its being accepted in the future."
Moreover, it seems doubtful to the writer whether the company's attor11.
(1874)
10 Bush (Ky.)
552, 19
Am. R. 80.
12.
(1874) 10 Bush 1. c. 554.
13. Biggers v. Owen (1887) 79 Ga.
658, 53 S. W. 193; Langdell, Summary

of Contracts sec. 4; Williston, Contracts,
sec. 60. It has, however, been contended that in a case of an offer looking to
the formation of a unilateral contract that
the offerer ought not to be free to
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neys could be regarded as acting for plaintiff in error while they were
engaged in assisting in the prosecution of the offenders. They were
engaged in a public duty, which they had voluntarily assumed, and they
were obliged, by the very assumption, to further the state's interest to
the exclusion of the company's. It would seem, therefore, that the ba'sis
of the decision may not be tenable either (1) because the company did
not prevent the performance of a condition, or (2) because even conceding that plaintiff in error did prevent the conviction, participation in
the conviction was not only a condition, but was also an act constituting
acceptance of the offer, and preventing such act was in fact a revocation
of the offer.
Conceding, however, both of the foregoing suggestions to be sound,
the decision may still be justified and sustained, if it is possible to say
that that which defendants in error did, even though it did not result
in conviction, was what plaintiff in error reasonably appeared to desire
as an acceptance of its offer. If a proper interpretation of the offer would
lead a person to believe that the company was willing to pay for what
was actually done as being the equivalent of a conviction it will surely
follow that defendants in error earned the reward. In order to reach
such a conclusion it will have to be said that the offerer expressed a willingness to pay for any disposition of the case by the state which might
be predicate on the alleged offenders' practically certain guilt. If the
offerer merely wanted the offeree to take such steps as to cause governmental action based on 'practically certain guilt, then the defendants in
error did accept the offer. It would seem, though, that such an interwithdraw the offer if the offeree attempts to accept the same until a reasonable time for the performance of the required act has expired.
It is said that
there is a collateral obligation to hold
the offer open under these conditions.
See article by Professor McGovney 27
Harv. Law Rev. 644 and also articles
by Professor Corbin, 26 Yale Law Journal 1. c. 194 et seq, and by Professor
Ballantine 5 Minn. L. R. 94. In Elkins
v. Commissioners (1912) 120 Pac. (Kan.)
1. c. 543 it was said in speaking of an
offer of a reward: "It is not questioned,
that upon any person seeing the published offer of reward and entering upon
an attempt to gain it, there arose a contract between !im and the Board of
County Commissioners conditioned that
if he effected 'the arrest and conviction'
of the murderer, the county' would pay

him $300."
The court evidently believed that the entry upon performance
by an offeree bound the offerer to give
the offeree an opportunity to earn the
reward by bringing about the arrest and
conviction of the offender.
The quoted
statement was not necessary to the actual
decision.
See also Smith V. State (1916)
151
Pac. (Nev.) 512, holding that where the
offer is for arrest and conviction a plaintiff may recover the reward, if he in
arresting the alleged criminal kills him.
The court stated that the killing was
justifiable and that the death of the offender excused plaintiff from procuring
his conviction.
It was also said that
there had been a substantial compliance
with the condition of the reward.
The
reward was offered pursuant to statutory
provision.
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pretation of the offer is highly speculative and for this reason unwarranted. It must not be forgotten that an offerer is free to dictate his own
terms and that an offeree assumes the risk of not meeting the same.
While it is true that "conviction" as used in this type of offer must be
liberally construed, still to say that the word means something short of
final conviction, or adjudication of guilt of the offender is to attribute
to it a distorted and unreasonable meaning."
J. L. PARKS

CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTIONS-REASONABLE DOUBT.
State v. Johnson. The trial court gave the following instruction: "If
the whole evidence in this case leaves the minds of the jury in such a
condition that they are neither morally certain of the defendant's innocence, nor morally certain of his guilt, then a reasonable doubt exists,
and the jury must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and
acquit him." The Supreme Court of Missouri condemned this instruction as "radically and incurably wrong". The reason given was: "The
theory is that, unless the jurors are morally certain of the defendant's
innocence, they cannot acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt. Such
a doubt exists if, from a consideration of all the evidence they are not
morally certain of the defendant's guilt."'
It is submitted that the words used by the trial judge do not justify
the interpretation given to them. He told the jury that if they were
certain of the defendant's guilt but still were not certain of his innocence-in other words, if their minds were in a state of complete indecision-they must acquit.
The trial court
apparently
recognized that the jury might conceivably find themselves in one of
three states of mind: (a) morally certain of the innocence of the accused; (b) morally certain of his guilt; or (c) a state of mind between
these two extremes. He merely called attention to their duty if they
found themselves in a state of uncertainty. It is in cases where this
frame of mind exists and in such cases only that an instruction on
reasonable doubt can legitimately have a decisive effect.
No clear statement of the present common law rule that proof in
criminal cases must be "beyond a reasonable doubt" seems to have been
formulated until the latter half of the eighteenth century. The term

14. The writer has been assisted in
finding the authorities by George E.
Woodruff, student in the School of Law.

1.
2.

(1921)
(1921)

234 S. W. 794.
234 S. W. 1. c. 796.
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seems to have been judicia!ly used first in Rex v. Donnelly.' The rule
there announced was adopted in this country at an early date.
In criminal as well as in civil cases the duty of adducing evidence
which will avail to convince the tryer of the fact is upon the burdenbearer.' As long as the jurors are in a state of uncertainty the burdenbearer has not met that duty and the verdict must be for his opponent.
An English I,ord Chancellor put the matter thus in Winans v. Attorney
General:' "I cannot say that I can come to a satisfactory conclusion
either way; but then the law relieves me from the embarrassment which
would otherwise condemn me to the solution of an insoluble problem,
because it directs me in my present state of mind to consider upon whom
is the burden of proof." It would appear, then, to be correct to instruct
a jury that if they are in a state of uncertainty about the case they must
find for the defendant.
Dicta and decisions have approved this rule. At a time when the
rule of reasonable doubt was being first formulated, Smith, B., told an
Irish jury in Rex v. Flemming' that: "If they had a doubt on the point
whether the witness had committed perjury or not, if their minds were
in a state of oscillation, they ought to acquit." (Italics supplied.) Chief
Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster' used similar language:
"_ - - - what is a reasonable doubt? - - - - It is that doubt which, after
the entire consideration of all the evidence has been taken, leaves the
jury uncertair.." An instruction embodying the same idea was approved
in Simmons v. State' by the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Any attempted definition of the expression "reasonable doubt" is
likely to confuse." In State v. Robinson" our court has said: "It is
3. (1803) 28 Howell State Trials, 1. c.
1095. For History of the Common Law
rule see 10 Arn. Law Rev. 642, 1. c.
656. See also Rex v. Plemming, infra,
note 7.
4. See e. g. Patterson, J., to the jury
in U. S. v. Lyon (1798) 6 American
State Trials 687 1. c. 694. "You must
be satisfied beyond all reasonable and
substantial doubt."
5. Wigmore,
Evidence,
see. 24972498.
6. (1904) A. C. 287 1. c. 289, Hin.
ton's Cases on Evidence, 1. c. 36.
7. (1798)
McNally,
Evidence
on
Pleas of the Crown, p. 2.
8. 4 American State Trials 93 1. c.
415. The case is also reported in 5 Cush.
295 and 52 American Decisions 711. In
the last reports of the case the words
here quoted do not appear. The report

in American State Trials is the product
of the ripest scholarship and would seem
to be more authentic than the others.
9. - (1909) 158 Ala. 8, 48 So. 606:
"The doubt that justifies an acquittal
must be reasonable doubt, such a doubt
as leaves the mind of the jury, in view
of all the evidence, in a state of reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the
defendant."
10. Hamilton v. People (1874)
29
Mich. 173 1. c. 194; Massey v. State
(1877) 1 Tex. App. 536 1. e. 570; Bland
v. State (1878) 4 Tex. App. 15, 1. c.
17; Abram v. State (1896) 36 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 44 (an extreme case); McAlpine v.
State (1872) 47 Ala. 78; People v. Hunt.
ington (1903) 138 Cal. 261, 70 Pac. 284.
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2497.
11. (1893) 117 Mo. 649, 23 S. W.
1066.
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difficult to explain simple terms like 'reasonable doubt' so as to make
them appear plainer. - - - - Every attempt to explain them renders an
explanation of the explanation necessary." In State v. Bond" the simple
definition of reasonable doubt as a substantial doubt, approved many
years before in State v. Nueslein," was declared to be sufficient, and
further attempts at definition were condemned.
Later the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that: "It is not reversible error to give or refuse such a definition" i. e. one similar to one approved in State v.
Nueslein, supra. The court also stated: "Such definition should not be
used.",4
The test suggested by the trial court in the case under review was
that of moral certainty. The jury were told that if they were not morally certain of defendant's guilt they had a reasoiable doubt and should
acquit. The words, "moral certainty" have been held in other jurisdicdictions to be synonymous with reasonable doubt in a number of cases."
But at least one well reasoned opinion states that the term is too favorable for a defendant. 6
The court in the case under review cited no authority in support of
its position and failed to note State v. David." There an instruction containing, in part, the same direction (though somewhat differently ex12.

(1905)

191

elo. 555, 90 S. W.

830.
13. (1857) 25 Mo. 111.
14. State v. Sykes (1912)
248 Mo.
708, 154 S. W. 1130.
15. State v. Long (1899)
72 Conn.
39, 43 Atl. 493; Bone v. State (1897)
102 Ga. 387, 30 S. E. 845; People v.
Chutuk (1912)
18 Cal. App. 768, 124
Pac. 566; Simmons v. State (1909) 158
Ala. 8, 48 So. 606; Bailey v. State (1901)
133 Ala. 155, 32 So. 57.
16. Territory v. Barth (1887) 15 Pac.
673, 1. c. 676.
17. (1895)
141 Mo. 380, 33 S. W.
28.
The instruction on reasonable doubt
follows: "And if, upon a view of the
whole case, you have a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the defendant, you will
acquit him; but such a reasonable doubt
as mentioned in these instructions, and
which will authorize- an acquittal on that
ground, must be a substantial doubt of
defendant's guilt, founded and based
upon the evidence and all the facts and
circumstances proven in the case, and not
a mere possibility of innocence.
If,
however, the whole evidence in the case

leaves your minds in such condition that
you are neither morally certain of the
defendant's guilt nor morally certain of
his innocence, then a reasonable doubt
exists and in such case you should give
the defendant the benefit of such doubt,
and acquit him." For an unknown reason this instruction is omitted in the official state report, but the approval of
the instruction is the same in both reports.
Ihe court stated that the instruction
was "entirely different from the instruction condemned in State v. Shaeffer, 89
Mo. 271, 1. S. W. 293."
In that case the discussion of the instruction was not necessary to the determination of the case and admitted not to be
so. It is difficult to understand how the instruction there given could have been
detrimental to the accused. After all is
said is there any logical difference between a conviction "beyond a reasonable
doubt" and a conviction "to a reasonable certainty"?
No doubt the former
expression sounds more serious and is
calculated to make a jury more careful
than the latter. See Pelitier v. Chicago,
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pressed) was given. The conviction was affirmed and the instruction
was expressly approved by Gantt, P. J.

Without expressing a decided opinion that a refusal to give the instruction under review would be a reversible error of which defendant
could complain, nevertheless, it seems that there is no objection ii the
instruction is given.
B. E. JR.
BY
PRESCRIPTION-PREEASEMENTS-ACQUISITION
SUMPTION OF A LOST GRANT. Kuhlman v. Stewart
The plaintiff
sought a permanent injunction restraining defendant from damming up
a drainage ditch which ran through portions of the farms of both. Plaintiff rested his claim to relief upon an alleged easement acquired by prescription. The evidence did not show user for the the requisite period
nor adverse user and for these reasons the result reached by the court
seems correct. The following passage, however, appears by way of
dictum.
"So that in this case proof of 30 years continuous use (were there
substantial proof of this character) might authorize the finding that
there was a proper grant, but for the express and positive evidence that
the whole thing rests upon a parol agreement between Caroline Kuhlman and Elmer Price, one of the Price heirs. The proof of the express
parol agreement destroys all presumption of a grant. In other words,
the proof shows that this ditch had its origin in an oral agreement, rather
than in a grant, and with this direct proof in the record, there is no room
for the presumption of a grant, which is the foundation of the doctrine
of prescription, in such cases. The oral agreement proven in this case
shows a license rather than an easement."' (Italics supplied.)'
This language seems to admit of the construction that the Supreme
Court of Missouri believes that a prescriptive right depends ultimately
upon the existence of a grant; that if it be shown as a fact that no
St. P., M. & 0.

Ry. Co. (1894)

88 Wis.

521, 60 N. W. 250.
State v. Schaeffer (1886) 89 Mo. 271,
1 S. W. 293, is approved in State v.
fackson (1888) 95 Mo. 623, 1. c. 658,
8 S. W. 749 and State v. Pierce (1912)
243 Mo. 524, 147 S. W. 970.
1. (1920) 221 S. W. 31.
2. Observe also this statement: "An
easement can only be created by grant."
221 S. W. 1- e. 33.
3. Why does Graves, J., imply that
thirty years user is necessary?
The

analogy of section 1305 R. S. Mo. 1919,
would suggest ten years as the proper
length of time.
Compare Ellison, J.,
in House v. Montgomery (1885) 19 Mo.
App. 1. c. 182: "Applying these principles to the case before us. we would
say that the period requisite to acquire
an easement in this state is ten years,
in analogy to our present statute of
limitations."
See also State v. Walters (1879) 69
Mo. 1. c. 465 and numerous cases cited
in note 23, infra.
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grant was ever made then there is no prescriptive right, no matter how
long the user.
We are confronted with this proposition: is the presumption of a
lost grant upon the showing of open, adverse, and uninterrupted user
under claim of right conclusive and therefore not a presumption at all
but a rule of substantive law; or is it a true presumption which is dissolved by producing evidence that no grant has in fact been made?
At common law title to land lay in seisin, but easements being mere
rights in land lay only in grant. As stated by a learned English authority, "Easements, being rights which are superadded to the ordinary
common law incidents of the ownership of real property, can only be
created by grant or statute."'
But at a very early date the common law courts recognized the desirability, indeed the necessity, of giving effect to long continued exercise of such rights in land even though no grant in fact existed. From
this policy of giving effect to user came the old common law doctrine
of prescription. If it could be shown that the right claimed had been
enjoyed continuously for a time before which "the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary" the court would presume the enjoyment to
be referable to a right which had a lawful origin, viz, a grant.' And
since it was impossible to produce evidence in refutation of this presumption it could not be questioned. Prescription, therefore, became at
a very early date one means of creating an easement.
In 1275 the statute of 3 Edw. I, c. 29, provided that none should declare upon the seisin of his ancestor beyond the beginning of the reign
of Richard I. (1189). Although this statute did not expressly include incorporeal hereditaments, the law courts adopted it, by way of analogy,
as fixing the time of legal memory.' From this time forward a showing
of uninterrupted enjoyment of a right in land from 1189 conclusively
established the existence of the right claimed.' As time went on, it became a practical impossibility to make use of prescription in establishing
the right because as the year 1189 receded the possibility of producing
evidence of uninterrupted enjoyment from that date became more and
more remote. In 1540 Parliament passed the second statute of limita4. Lord Halsbury, Laws of England,
Vol. XI, page 243.
S. Lord Halsbury, Laws of England,
Vol. XI, page 258; Gale, Easements,
8th Ed., pages 192, 193, 9th Ed., 188.
6. Gale. Easements, 8th Ed., page
188, 9th Ed., page 183, and authorities
there cited, See in general: Wallace v.
Fletcher (1855) 30 N. H. 1. c. 445;
Tracy v. Atherton (1864) 36 Vt. 503;

Strickler v. Todd (1823)
10 Serg. &
Rawle (Pa.) 1. c. 63; Coolidge v. Learned (1829) 8 Pick. (Mass.) 504, and authorities there cited; House v. Montgoinery (1885) 19 Mo. App. 170; Anthony v.
Building Co. (1905) 188 Mo. 1. c. 719,
87 S. W. 921.
7. Gale, Easements, 8th Ed. page 188,
and authorities there cited.
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tions s shortening the period within which actions for the recovery of land
could be maintained to sixty years. However, the common law courts
declined to follow the precedent long established under the statute of 3
Edw. ,0 and continued to require proof of enjoyment from 1189 to
raise a right by prescription." The hardship and injustice of this rule
subsequently led to the introduction of a fiction. At first, it appears
that a showing of user since the memory of "living man" was held to
raise a presumption that the user had existed since legal memory i. e.
1189. This presumption, however, could be rendered useless by evidence
of non-existence of the right claimed at any time during the period
since 1189.?
Later, the fiction of a modern lost grant was introduced.
If it could be established that the right claimed had been enjoyed for

8.
9.

(1540) 32 Hen. 8.
The reason for this is not apparent from any of the authorities examined. In Wallace v. Fletcher (1855) 30
N. H. 1. c. 445, the learned Judge
wrote:
"In
1275, by statute 3 Edw. 1,
writs of right were limited to rights
actually enjoyed after the first year of
Richard 1, (1189)
and by analogy to
the period fixed by that statute, it was
held that time of legal memory reached
to that date, and not beyond it.
Being
a fixed date, it was of course continually
receding, until it became absurd, since
it was practically impossible to prove
any fact of so ancient a date.
"The courts might have held. when
difficulties were found to result from
this arbitrary rule, that the ancient law,
which fixed the period beyond which
actual memory did not reach, was still
in force, or they might have availed
themselves of the passage of the statute
of 32 Henry VIII, which reduced the
limitation of writs of right to three
score years, to decide by analogy to that
statute, as was done in tle time of Edward I, that the time of legal memory
vat reduced to sixty years.
It appears
by Littleton, 170, that in his time it
was seriously contended that the time
of legal memory was not changed by
the Statute of Edward I.
And Rolle,
C. J., was of that opinion, though he
admits the practice was otherwise.
2
Rolle's Ab. Prescription, P.
And many
respectable authorities maintained, after

the statute of 32 Henry VIII, that time
of legal memory was sixty years, as
Rolle, C. J., Sergeant Williams, 2 Win.
Saund. 175, n. a., Lord Mansfield, 2 Ev.
Poth. 136, Blackstone, J., 2 Com. 31,
Abbott, C. J., 5 B. & A. 215, and Dallas,
C. J., C. B. Moore 558.
"From causes which are not now ap.
parent, neither of these views prevail.
ed, and the consequence was that no
title to any easement could be supported
upon proof of occupation and enjoy.
ment, however long continued,
if its
origin could be shown."
To like effect
see Coolidge v. Learned (1829) 8 Pick.
(Mass.)
1. c. 508.
See also Jones,
Easements, see. 158. This section seems
to be a superficial and unsatislactory
treatment of the English law.
10. Gale, Easements, 8th Ed. pages
189, 190; Bryant v. Foot (1867) 2 Q. B.
per Cockburn, C. J., at page 181.
11. Bryant v. Foot (1867)
2 Q. B.
per Cockburn, C. J., at page 181: "Juries
were first told that from user, during
living memory, or even during twenty
years, they might presume a lost grant
or deed; next they were recommended
to make such presumption; and lastly,
as the final consummation of judicial leg.
islation, it was held that a jury should
be told, not only that they might, but
also that they were bound to presume
the existence of such a lost grant, although neither judge nor jury, nor any
one else, had the shadow of a belief
that any such instrument had ever really
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the period set by the statute of limitations for the bringing of real
actions (at first sixty years and finally twenty years in England) the
court would instruct the jury that they might infer a grant made in
modern times but now lost. 2 This inference, of course, could not be
made if the evidence showed that no grant had in fact been made."
Finally, the presumption came to be regarded as conclusive. That is,
the court instructed the jury that if twenty years (or whatever the statutory period may be in the particular jurisdiction) uninterrupted, open,
exclusive, and adverse user was shown they were bound to presume a
grant once made of the easement claimed but now lost. This ivas attained in England in Angus v. Dalton." Although this case has been regarded as-settling the law in England in conformity with the rule stated, the opinions of the judges were by no means harmonious. 5
The authorities in this country cannot be said to be altogether harmonious. However, it can be said that the well considered cases which
review the authorities and discuss the principles involved are in substantial agreement. They recognize that the theory of a lost grant is
wholly a fiction of judicial creation; and they are bold enough to frankly
settle upon judicial legislation by which the statute of limitations is extended to incorporeal hereditaments."
The question has been considered many times' in Missouri and there
seems to be (aside from the case under review) an agreement that Missouri follows the English and the better American rule.
existed."

Mellor

In

and

this case Cockburn,

Lush,

JJ.,

C. J.,

did their best

to pievent the development from taking
form in a hard and fast rule.
12. The earliest reported decision to
this effect is that of Lewis v. Price
(1761)
2 Win. Saund. 175 a, per Lord
Blackburn in Dalton v. Angus (1881)
L. R. 6 App. Cas. at page 812.
13.
Watkins v. Peck (1843)
13 N.
H. 1. c. 370: "The adverse or exclusive
use of water in a particular manner,
for the term of twenty years, furnishes
See
presumptive evidence of a grant."
comment on this case in Wallace v.
Fletcher (1855) 30 N. H. 434.
14. L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 85, 4 Q. B. D.
162, 6 App. Cas. 740.
15. See excellent analysis of this ease
in Gale, Easements, 8th Ed. pp. 194197.
16. In
Tyler v. Wilkerson (1827) 4
Mason 397, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, Mr. Justice Story uses this language which has

been widely quoted and followed:
"By our law, upon principles of public convenience, the term of twenty
years of exclusive uninterrupted enjoyment has been held a conclusive presumption of a grant or right ........
The presumption is applied as a presumption juris et de jure, wherever by
possibility a right may be acquired in
any manner known to the law."
In Wallace v. Fletcher (1855) 30 N.
H. 434, 1. c. 447, Bell, J., speaking for
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
employs this clear and persuasive reasoning: "It was the wise course, prescribed by principle as well as by public convenience, to overrule the absurd
decisions which sanctioned a fixed point
in the early history of England, as the
limit of legal memory, and at the same
time to restore the principle upon which
that decision appears to be made, that in
cases where the Legislature have not
fixed a precise rule of limitation, rights
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In Pitz-man v. Boyce, 7 Sherwood, P. J., considering a license, stated
by way of dictum: "Though the statute of limitations has no reference
to easements, yet, where a party has enjoyed an easement for such length
of time as to confer title to land from the true owner to a disseizor, this
adverse enjoyment will in law establish the right to the easement as
against the owner of the servient estate." ....
But he added, "And such adverse user for the statutory period will
give origin to the rebuttable legal presumption of a grant, even though
the use in its inception was a trespass."
It is submitted that these propositions are contradictory. The au8
thorities cited in support of the first proposition" do support it unequivwhich is unsatisfacNuisances
on
of
Wood
exception
the
(with
ocally
tory) and of necessity negative the second. The last three cases" cited
by the court involve the acquisition of an easement of a right of way
by the public. This statement in State v. Walters gives the principle:
"The public may acquire the right to the use of a road or easement over
the land of another from long use of a road. as such by the public, acquiesced in by the owner, and adverse occupancy and use of the same for
a period of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations for
bringing actions of ejectment."
In House v. Montgomery both licenses and easements are discussed.
As to the latter, while it is recognized that there is a conflict of authority,
the decision seems to favor the view that user for a period fixed by the
statute of limitations is sufficient to establish the easement. Of course,
the user must have the proper qualities.
In Anthony v. Building Co.' the court denied the existence of an
shall be acquired and barred by a prescription of such length of time as has
been fixed by the Legislature as the
proper limitation in analogous cases."
In Tracy v. Atherton (1864) 36 Vt.
503, Poland, C. J., states the proposition
"The statute of limitations
this way:
does not extend to these incorporeal
rights, but it has now become universally settled that an uninterrupted use of
a way or other easement, under a claim
of right, for the period of time fixed by
the statute as a bar to the recovery of
lands held adversely, gives the person
so using it a full and absolute right to
such easement, as much as if granted
to him.
In Strickler v. Todd (1823) 10 Serg.
& Rawle (Pa.) 63, 1. c. 68, the Supreme
by
(opinion
Pennsylvania,
Court of

Duncan, J.) says: "It is well settled,
that if there has been an uninterrupted,
exclusive enjoyment, above twenty-one
years, . . . . this affords a conclusive
presumption of right in the party so
enjoying it, and this is equal to a right
by prescription."
17. (1892) 111 Mo. 387; 19 S. W.
1104.
18. Wood on Nuisances, see. .704;
House v. Montgomery (1885) 19 Mo.
App. 170.
19. State v. Walters (1879) 69 Mo.
463; State v. Wells (1879) 70 Mo. 635;
State v. Proctor (1886) 90 Mo. 334, 2
S. W. 472.
20. (1885) 19 Mo. App. 170.
21. (1905) 188 Mo. 704, 1. c. 719,
87 S. W. 921.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

easement because there was a failure to show that the user was adverse
and under a claim of right. The court stated, however, as follows:
"When the evidence sufficiently shows the use of the privilege for a
length of time equal to that prescribed by the Statute of Limitations for
acquiring title to land by adverse possession, and that the use was aderse and under a claim of right with the knowledge of the landowner, the
right to the easement is established."
The most effective statement of the" prevailing doctrine was made
in 1912 by Goode, J.,' as follows: "But an easement in the nature of a
private way may be acquired by prescription or ten year's adverse use,
which is equivalent to a grant. In most cases the law allows the prescriptive right on the fiction of a prior grant of which the evidence is
lost. In this case a fictitious grant need not be presumed, as there is
proof of a futile attempt at an actual grant. Old theories about prescriptions and presumed grants, though still alluded to in opinions for
the sake of seeming consistency, don't have much force in modern law.
The question of a prescriptive right depends on adverse use for 'the
limitation period."
It will be observed that Goode, J., had before him a case where there
had been a futile attempt to make an actual grant. Therefore, it was not
possible to decide the case upon any presumption of a lost grant. This
decision would seem clearly to represent the law of Missouri today.'
22. Power v. Dean (1905) 112 Mo.
App. 288, 86 S. W. 1100.
23. Smith v. Sedalia (1899) 152 Mo.
283, 53 S. W. 907 (dictum); Howard
County v. C. & A. Ry. Co. (1895) 130
Mo. 652, 32 S. W. 651 (bare statement
that county acquired a prescriptive title
to bridge by user for ten years; in fact
user had been for twenty years at least) ;
James v. City of Kansas (1884) 83 Mo.
567 (user of sewer for thirteen years
gives a prescriptive right) ; Field v.
Mark (1894)
125 Mo. 502, 28 S. W.
1004 (loose dictum).Autenrieth v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co.
(1889) 36 Mo. App. 254 ("But on the
other hand, if the use by the plaintiffs,
or the public, was adverse, continuous,
and as a matter of right, for the period
of ten years prior to the building of the
defendant's railroad, then this road was
either a public highway or was a 'private road belonging to the plaintiffs.");
Boyce v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1902)
168 Mo. 583, 68 S. W. 920 (all defend-

ant could acquire was an easement. "By
analogy, upon the theory of an implied
lost grant, the defendant has acquired
by prescription an easement .......
1. c. 595. "So that although technically
the statute of limitation does not apply
to an easement, still by j.udicial interpretation the result is the same as if the
statute did so apply.")
Graham v. Olson (1905) 116 Mo. App.
272, 92 S. W. 728 (dictum); Sanford v.
Kern (1909) 223 Mo. 616, 122 S. W.
1051 (right of way, the outcome of an
oral agreement, was used for fourteen
years.
Decision
in favor of person
claiming the right of way.
Opinion
somewhat confused in that the writer
seems to think that an easement obtained by prescription is the same as a socalled irrevocable license.
The court also announces this curious
doctrine: "In the first place Sanford's
claim to an easement originated in contract. He was not an interloper, squatter or mere trespasser.
This is impor-
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The propriety in applying, by
It is good policy to bar stale claims.
way of analogy, the period set by the statute of limitations for the bringing of actions to recover land to easements is apparent. The first statute
of limitations was so applied. The reason for the departure from this
precedent does not appear to be explained by the authorities and the
weight of modern authority follows it.'
D. G. W.

tant as furnishing a foundation for a
claim of right, because the Statute of
Limitations borrowed to effectuate prescriptive rights, can only be invoked by
a person cl.iming by right and not by
No flux of time will ripen a
wrong.
bad title into a good one unless possession is blessed by a claim of right."
How is that declaration to be reconciled with this paragraph in the same
opinion: "That a prescriptive right is,
by a fiction of the law, deemed to rest
in a grant, or lost deed, as the old
learning teaches, is of small significance
in modern jurisprudence; for it is settled law that the right to a way by
prescription may be established in the
same way as the title to land, to-wit, by
adverse possession under a claim of right
Power
uninterrupted for ten years"?
v. Dean aprroved.)
Geisinan v. Trish (1910) 151 Mo. App.
714, 132 S. W. 298 ("The rule is that
an easement in nature of a private way
may be acquired by ten years' adverse
use, and that a right thus acquired is
Leiweke v. Link
right.")
a vested
147 Mo. App. 19, 126 S. W.
(1909)
("After the year 1847, when the
197.
limitation period of actions to recover
real property was reduced from twenty
to ten years, the public might have acquired an easement in the road by ten
year's open, adverse and uninterrupted
use under a claim of right."); Dunham
v. Joyce (1895) 129 Mo. 5, 31 S. W. 33,7
(dictum).
Daudt v. Steiert (1918) 205 S. W. 222
(There was a claim of an easement of

that
but the court decided
drainage
there was nothing more than a license.
In arguing against the existence of an
easement, Walker, P. J., made this curi"There must, however,
ous statement:
be as a condition precedent to the establishment of an easement by prescription, clear proof of a well-defined oral
Such
in regard thereto."
agreement
seems to be contrary to the theory of
prescription even including the fiction
For a grant was in
of a lost grant.
writing.); Schroer v. Brooks (1920) 204
Mo. App. 1. c. 581, 224 S. W. 53 ("The
objection to this deed was based altogether upon the theory that an easeSuch was the
ment lies only in grant.
fiction of the common law, and where
the easement had been enjoyed for a
sufficient length of time, a grant of that
easement was presumed, but a prescriptive right does not rest exclusively in
grant, it may be established in the same
way as title to land, that is, by adverse
possession under a claim of right unThe deed
interrupted for ten years.
was sufficient to show the intent of the
plaintiff to claim from Wolf Pen Hollow, southeasterly, etc., and the ten-year
statute ran against the grantor in that
See also Novinger v. Shoop
deed.")
(1918) 201 S. W. 64.
24. Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd. ed.,
sec. 514 and authorities there cited;
Jones, Easements, sees. 161-162; 9 R.
C. L. 783; Washburn, Easements, p.
106.
See 16 Harv. L. R. 438; 2 lb.
25.
43-44; 7 ib. 234.

